After a disastrous series of events in January killed 12 workers at the Sago mine in West Virginia, the International Coal Group (ICG), which owned the mine, hired the public relations firm Dix and Eaton to control the damage.

Before any official investigation was released, ICG claimed that lightning sparked the initial explosion at Sago Mine—an act that diverted much news coverage from the systemic failure of safety apparatus and procedures. Of course, lightning also suggests the deaths were somehow the result of a natural occurrence, not corporate misconduct.

But a new report commissioned by West Virginia's Governor brings the most important elements of the tragedy back to the forefront. The first sentence discussing “Causes and Consequences” reads, “It is important to make a clear distinction between what caused the explosion and what caused the disaster.”

That distinction is critical.

The Sago explosion occurred in a closed mine section. It ripped through an inadequate barrier, killing one miner. Eleven more men died from carbon monoxide poisoning because basic safety equipment and procedures were absent or failed to work.

None of the victims should have died, regardless of what triggered the explosion. As the Sago report, compiled by Davitt McAteer, head of the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) under President Clinton, noted, "There would have been no disaster if the explosion had been contained by the supposedly explosion-proof seals."

ICG's failure to protect its workers was aided by MSHA, which required seals to isolate closed-off mine sections to withstand a force of just 20 pounds per square inch. Just two weeks ago, on July 19, did MSHA finally raise that standard to 50 pounds per square inch, as is the norm among industrialized nations.

The seal's failure was just one of many. As Randal McCloy—the sole Sago survivor— recovered from a coma that left him unable to detail the events for many weeks, he reported at least four of the miners' rescue breathing devices failed to function properly. McCloy, who had thorough training with the devices, said the 11 men who survived the explosion were forced to share a seven devices designed to provide just one hour of air for one person.

Rescuers reached McCoy and his dead companions more than 40 hours after the explosion. Why McCoy was not fatally poisoned remains a mystery.

Congress responded to glaring deficiencies in mine safety laws and enforcement only when five more fatalities resulted from a similar explosion and failure of safety measures in a Kentucky mine—five months after Sago. Congress enacted several safety improvements for underground mines and maximum civil penalties for serious safety violations were almost quadrupled.

But those improvements are not enough. To prevent more needless deaths, the U.S. should match or exceed the worker protection standards of our peers.

As the Sago report notes, less than one month after the Sago disaster, all of the 72 miners trapped underground by toxic fumes in a Saskatchewan potash mine were rescued after they waited 40 hours in a secure survival chamber with food, water and oxygen. MSHA is authorized to require that American miners enjoy similar protection, but, given the Bush administration's laissez-faire attitude toward worker safety, Congress should require it.

And while the increase in fines is welcome they must be applied and collected—in the past decade 40 percent of MSHA fines went unpaid. Miners understandably are skeptical that will happen in light of lax enforcement and President Bush's nomination of mining industry executive Richard Stickler as MSHA's chief—a man who told Congress just weeks after Sago that existing safety laws were adequate.

While many occupations involve some degree of risk, the “dangerous job” cliché attached to mining is a diversion from the real threat: Many corporations simply find it cheaper to risk their employees' health and lives than to protect them.

Let's not be distracted by uncertainty about the ignition source of the Sago explosion, nor satisfied with the initial improvements in law Congress has enacted. Decisive action still is needed to prevent the next mining disaster.

The recommendations in West Virginia's Sago report for improved underground communications, breathing devices, and rescue breathers should be implemented promptly, but that alone is insufficient.

“What's killing miners today has killed coal miners for years,” former MSHA official Celeste Monforton explained. “Coal can be mined safely—there are companies doing it. And if a company won't mine coal safely, they should be shut down.”

Closing down facilities run by scofflaw corporations is an essential complement to legislation and would establish a standard of decency that, in a civilized society, human lives are more important than maximizing corporate profit.

© 2005 ReclaimDemocracy.org

 

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